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Theories regarding the nature and achievement of personhood in a communitarian 
context appear to differ in significant respects in the writings of several contemporary 
African philosophers. Ifeanyi Menkiti seems to regard ethnic differences as sufficient 
to warrant a national accommodation of multiculturalism with respect to moralities 
and attendant beliefs. Kwasi Wiredu argues that there is a substantive universal moral 
principle that undercuts such apparent and relatively superficial diversity. 
Communitarianism also seems to provide a better framework for explaining how a 
human being becomes a person than classical liberal theory as enunciated by someone 
like John Rawls. 
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I want to focus on elements of communitarian theory in the writings of several 
contemporary African philosophers, and then explore areas where those elements may 
challenge one another as well as areas where they may overlap or supplement one 
another. The philosophers I am going to concentrate on are Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwasi 
Wiredu and D.A. Masolo. I will also make brief reference to the work of John Rawls 
and liberal theory generally. 
 
The elements I will focus on are as follows: the signif cance of personhood generally; 
Kwasi Wiredu’s Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality; Ifeanyi Menkiti on problems 
of the African nation-state; pre-personhood in liberalism and communitarian theory; 
Menkiti on the transition to personhood. 
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Personhood 
The process a human being must go through in order to achieve personhood in a 
communitarian context is complex. That a human being will transition to personhood 
is certainly not a given - it is an achievement not only on the part of the individual, but 
also on the part of the community which labors, perfectly deliberately and 
responsibly, to transform human beings into “persons through acquiring and 
participating in the socially generated knowledge of n rms and actions that we learn 
to live by in order to impose humaneness upon our humanness” (Masolo 2010, 155). 
 
Western epistemology likes to point to the acquisition of language and the consequent 
enhanced ability to communicate as perhaps the mosti portant dimension to social 
interaction. On a communitarian view linguistic ability is certainly not to be ignored 
(Menkiti 1984, 172; Masolo 2010, 142), but it is the moral transformation facilitated 
by those communicative skills that is more highly accl imed. In the following 
mélange of passages about his native Akan culture, he Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi 
Wiredu puts it this way: 
a human person is essentially the center of a thick set of concentric 
circles of obligations and responsibilities matched by rights and 
privileges (Wiredu 1992, 199). 
 
… The theater of moral upbringing is the home, at prents’ feet and 
within range of kinsmen’s inputs. The mechanism is precept, example 
and correction. The temporal span of the process is lifelong (Wiredu 
1992, 195). 
 
…. The communalistic orientation of … society … means that an 
individual’s image will depend rather crucially upon the extent to 
which his or her actions benefit others than himself [or herself], not, of 
course by accident or coincidence but by design. … an individual who 
remained content with self-regarding successes [with self-interest] 
would be viewed as so circumscribed in outlook as not to merit the title 
of a real person (Wiredu 1992, 200). 
 
There are those who defend this kind of social order for its humanitarian orientation - 
that its enunciated, overriding concern is the welfar  of all. They hold that being 
morally obligated to other persons and to the community generally in specific and 
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meaningful ways makes for a social context in which the Other and the Self are 
equally and mutually prominent and dependent. 
 
On the other hand, those of a so-called ‘liberal’persuasion argue that given these 
ethical and moral priorities, a communitarian orientation subsumes the individual to 
the group in a manner that is (morally) repugnant. For them, the priority ought not to 
be to stipulate what rights the group has over the individual, but rather to stipulate 
what rights the individual has independently of thegroup, or as Masolo puts it, 
paraphrasing John Rawls, “the individual … as the beneficiary of an equal right to the 
most extensive liberty that is compatible with a similar liberty for others” (Masolo 
2010, 228). 
 
Inevitably, it seems, in discussions of communitarian cultures, their value systems 
relating to personhood end up being presented as counterpoised to those said to be 
foundational to so-called liberal, democratic cultures and societies. In which case, 
‘traditional’ Africa comes second once again, this time for not prioritizing individual 
rights and responsibilities, which becomes linked to any number of endemic social 
and political ‘problems’ (“tribalism”, for example). 
 
Wiredu’s Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality 
Kwasi Wiredu has sought to restructure this apparently irresolvable disagreement 
between communitarian theory and liberalism on the issue of individual rights by 
positing a universal moral principle that must, he says, “underlie any human society in 
order for it to qualify as a society,” which he calls the Principle of Sympathetic 
Impartiality. For him, “What we need to do is to specify a principle of conduct such 
that without its recognition - which does not necessarily mean its invariable 
observance - the survival of [any] human society n a tolerable condition [his italics] 
would be inconceivable” (Wiredu 1996a, 29). He tells us that this Principle of 
Sympathetic Impartiality may be expressed by the imperative “Let your conduct at all 
times manifest a due concern for others” (Wiredu 1996a, 29). He acknowledges that 
the principle is reminiscent of the Golden Rule; but the reasoning he uses to justify its 
foundational status is as follows: “I suggest that it takes little imagination to foresee 
that life in any society in which everyone openly avowed the contrary of this principle 
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and acted accordingly would inevitably be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish’ [his italics], 
and probably short” (Wiredu 1996a, 29; my italics in part). 
 
Menkiti and the Nation-State 
The status of Wiredu’s Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality as foundational would 
appear to become insignificant following the strategy advised by Ifeanyi Menkiti in 
his essay, “Philosophy and the State in Africa: Some Rawlsian Considerations”. In 
many African nation-states today, Menkiti observes, there are multiple ethnic and 
linguistic communities whose cultural beliefs conflict and therefore have disparate 
interests that prove to be an obstacle to the emergence of a healthily unified body 
politic. For him, this is a situation in which “one holds out little hope for the 
possibility of coordinating the multiple intentions of a given citizen body through a 
unified moral or customary belief system” (Menkiti 2002, 37; my italics). 
 
There are nation-states in Africa today that are th consequence of the arbitrary 
borders established during the period of European colonization. Their populations are 
composites of diverse ethnic groups that have little in common apart from a 
counterproductive ambition to gain control of the instruments of government and use 
them to advance their own community-specific interests. The provisional solution 
Menkiti proposes, derived from Rawls’ strategy for risk aversion and the avoidance of 
destructive conflicts, is to have a ‘bare bones’ or ‘thin’ notion of national government: 
let me simply note that if the African state succeeded in maintaining 
security, providing infrastructure, and facilitating trade, if it could 
understand itself as being an agent, in good faith, for these three things, 
then its functions would have been well served. …. The key insight in 
support of this position is an essentially Rawlsian one. The more 
individuals and communities are kept from forcing their 
comprehensive views on one another as a consequence of assigning 
some sort of moral majesty to the state and its organs, the better for the 
health of the body politic (Menkiti 2002, 38; my ital cs). 
 
Of concern is that Wiredu’s supposedly foundational Principle of Sympathetic 
Impartiality seems to pale into insignificance as a consequence of Menkiti’s proposed 
scenario. Presumably Wiredu means for the principle also to be a substantive 
influence internal to the nation-state, on relations among people in multiple and 
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disparate communities. If so, why can it not serve as the basis for some form of 
effective force and meaningful strategy that could override and temper conflicting 
communal interests in the African context? Wiredu also, of course, acknowledges the 
existence of differences between cultures and communities anywhere in the world. 
However, those differences, apparently, are not morally foundational and are 
therefore relegated by him to the status of supplementary categories of “customs” and 
“lifestyles”. His point is that people who emphasize the relativity of moral values in 
different cultures are in fact themselves exaggerating he relatively contingent 
anomalies generated by differences in customs and lifestyles rather than foundational 
moral principles. He describes customs as “contingent norms of life, rather than forms 
of morality in the strict sense of this word” (Wiredu 1996a, 30), and argues that they 
could include “usages, traditions, manners, conventions, grammars, vocabularies, 
etiquette, fashions, aesthetic standards, observances, taboos, rituals, folkways, [and] 
mores” (Wiredu 1996a, 28; my italics). 
 
With more specific respect to the interests of thises ay, Wiredu argues that “The real 
difference between communalism and individualism has to do with custom and 
lifestyle rather than anything else. … [because] both are, conceptually, of a kind and 
are distinct from morality in the strict sense” (Wiredu 1996b, 72; my italics). 
Apparently this model can also apply to different cultural manifestations of 
communalism within a single nation-state as well: 
In this strict sense morality, from the standpoint of conduct, is the 
motivated pursuit of sympathetic impartiality. Such values as 
truthfulness, honesty, justice, chastity, etc. are simply aspects of 
sympathetic impartiality, and do not differentiate morality from culture 
to culture. At best, what the contingencies of culture may do is to 
introduce variations of detail in the definition of some of these values. 
Thus the concept of chastity in a polyandrous society will 
accommodate more diversified sexual contacts with men on the part of 
a woman than in a monogamous environment. These differing 
constraints on definition are, of course, constrains of custom, and do 
not flow from sympathetic impartiality by any stretch of logical 
implication. This is true of customs in general, and explains why, 
though morality, strictly so-called, does not and cannot differ from 
place to place, custom can and does. But since strict morality, at least 
as precept, is a social constraint, and any society will have one set of 
idiosyncrasies or another, what are often called alternative moralities 
will be found, on examination, to be composites of universal morality 
and contingent custom (Wiredu 1996a, 30). 
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Thus, according to Wiredu, customs and lifestyles are primarily of instrumental and 
empirical value for highlighting the diversity of ways in which the universal moral 
principle is implemented in different cultures and communities. In which case there 
would seem to be good reason and certainly room for formulating national strategies 
that would target, invoke, and redirect or recast underlying currents of sympathetic 
impartiality as unifying, cross-communal motivations. 
 
To conclude this point, is the Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality something that can 
be taken seriously in the African context as a reformative influence on motivation and 
behavior generally? Or is the Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality better appreciated 
as something that effectively applies only internally to members of a specific cultural 
community? Or, again, is the Principle of Sympathetic Impartiality one of those 
hypothetical ideas that philosophers are said to be prone to invent, but when it comes 
to the real world, are sometimes difficult to substantiate? 
 
Pre-Personhood in Liberalism and Communitarian Theory 
When reviewing the narratives relating to social contract theory, or to Rawls’ 
“original position”, what I find relevant to the interests of this essay is the silence of 
liberal theory when it comes to accounting for the origin of the rational, mature 
human beings who are a party, in fact essential, to the social contract. Liberal theory 
may have much of interest and value to say about contracting individuals and their 
rights and freedoms; but what about the social context that produced those individuals 
when they were in the pre-personhood stage? Does not liberal theory have to 
presuppose or presume some form of social context that produces the rational, mature 
individuals who enter into the social contract or who become engaged in the exercise 
consequent to what rawls refers to as “the veil of ignorance”? 
 
I do not want to misspeak on this issue. I know there is nothing original about my 
raising this point. I do appreciate the justificatory nature of discussions relating to the 
contract with respect to its presuppositions. Still, on historical, anthropological, 
simply empirical grounds, the contracting individuals re not autochthonous and, as 
Annette Baier (1988; 1994) among others has suggested, must be the products of 
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some forms of affective as well as reasoned human relationships in order to be 
capable of contracting. 
 
Menkiti on the Transition to Personhood 
Another of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s insightful comparisons between Rawls’ liberalism 
(Rawls 1999; 2001) and African communitarianism concer s this pre-personhood 
period in a human being’s lifetime. However, I wonder whether on this occasion 
Menkiti perhaps understates the strengths of his own communal orientation and 
therefore is a bit too generous to his old mentor, Professor Rawls. This relates to the 
transition from what I am calling pre-personhood to full-blown personhood. Menkiti 
suggests that Rawls and communitarian theory share something in common with 
respect to recognizing the essential and important change that takes place when an 
individual transitions from childhood and youth to being a mature, rational, 
responsible person in the full sense of the term. 
 
Speaking on behalf of Rawls, Menkiti puts it this way with respect to liberalism’s 
view of the necessary condition that promotes the transition from pre-personhood to 
personhood: 
Rawls makes explicit part of what is meant by the general ethical 
requirement of respect for persons, noting that those who are capable 
of a sense of justice are owed the duties of justice, with this capability 
construed in its sense of a potentiality which may or may not have been 
realized (Menkiti 2004, 330; my italics). 
Menkiti addresses the same issue with respect to a communitarian context, stating that 
such a society tends: 
to be guarded in its attitude toward the young, though still continuing 
to be open-minded until they, the young, show themselve  capable of 
becoming full participants in communal life, through the discharge of 
the various obligations defined by their stations. For it is the carrying 
out of these obligations that transforms them from the it-status of early 
childhood, marked by an absence of moral function, nto the person-
status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense 
(Menkiti 2004, 330). 
The point being that communitarian theory, once again, does a better job of speaking 
to this transitional period than liberalism. Communitarian theory has no reservations 
about prescribing in reasonably glowing terms the process of education the 
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child/youth undergoes while clasped in the not always tender embrace of the extended 
family. On the other hand, liberal theory, again, can only posit, only rather vaguely 
presuppose, what the origins of the full-blown indivi ual might involve without 
explaining how that person comes to be. Menkiti does not enthusiastically score one 
for communitarianism on this point, but it seems to me that he certainly could. 
 
Conclusion 
One noteworthy development in many contemporary accounts of the communitarian 
character of African cultures and societies is thatey no longer are introduced with 
apologetic rhetoric for not meeting the ‘standards’ set by liberalism for individual 
liberties. Nor are they essentially justified by some sort of muted appeal to ‘tradition’. 
Today African philosophers are reevaluating the communitarian pasts and presents of 
their cultures as a heritage that has genuinely positive attributes, though that heritage 
will need to be refined if it is to carry over into he present day. Communalism 
therefore deserves to be considered as a worthy altern tive to the individualism that 
continues to be touted by liberal theory as deserving of unquestioned universal 
acclaim. 
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